Three mega-deals move simultaneously; claims rates rewrite the playbook.
Today at a Glance
The mega-class action cycle has rarely been this active.Duane MorrisTop 10 class-action settlements aggregated to $79B in 2025 (up from $42B in 2024); 13,000+ federal class actions filed in 2025. The BCBS Subscriber Antitrust settlement of $2.67 billion entered distribution on May 11, with JND issuing payments to approximately 7.8 million claimants.Bloomberg LawBCBS Subscriber Antitrust ($2.67B): JND began distributing on May 11 to approximately 7.8M claimants. Net distributable ~$1.9B. The net distributable amount is roughly $1.9 billion after fees and administrative costs.Bloomberg LawBCBS Subscriber Antitrust ($2.67B): JND began distributing on May 11 to approximately 7.8M claimants. Net distributable ~$1.9B. Bartz v. Anthropic, at $1.5 billion, had its Rule 23(e) fairness hearing on May 14 before Judge Martínez-Olguín, and the court has the matter under submission.Publishers WeeklyBartz v. Anthropic ($1.5B): largest copyright settlement in U.S. history. Fairness hearing held May 14 before Judge Martínez-Olguín; under submission. 91.3% claims rate. The Bartz 91.3% claims rate is the new high-water benchmark for Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii) fairness analysis.Publishers WeeklyBartz v. Anthropic ($1.5B): largest copyright settlement in U.S. history. Fairness hearing held May 14 before Judge Martínez-Olguín; under submission. 91.3% claims rate. Purdue Pharma's $7.4 billion reorganization became effective on May 1, with the initial tranche of $1.5 billion from the Sacklers and $900 million from Purdue paid at effectiveness.Law360Purdue/Sackler ($7.4B): plan effective May 1, 2026; initial $1.5B Sacklers + $900M Purdue at effectiveness; subsequent Sackler tranches over 15 years. Subsequent Sackler tranches are scheduled over fifteen years, and the operating assets have transferred to a new non-profit, Knoa Pharma.Law360Purdue/Sackler ($7.4B): plan effective May 1, 2026; initial $1.5B Sacklers + $900M Purdue at effectiveness; subsequent Sackler tranches over 15 years. The Visa/Mastercard revised interchange settlement, valued at approximately $38 billion, is heading toward final approval in late 2026 or early 2027.Law360Visa/Mastercard revised interchange settlement ~$38B announced November 10, 2025 in MDL 1720 (E.D.N.Y., Judge Brodie); final approval expected late 2026 / early 2027. Bayer's Roundup class settlement, structured at $7.25 billion over 21 years, has a fairness hearing scheduled for July 9, 2026.Law360Bayer Roundup class ($7.25B over 21 years): Rule 23(b)(3) class for NHL claimants; preliminary approval March 2026; fairness hearing July 9, 2026. According to Duane Morris's 2026 Class Action Review, the top ten class-action settlements aggregated to $79 billion in 2025, up from $42 billion the year before.Duane MorrisTop 10 class-action settlements aggregated to $79B in 2025 (up from $42B in 2024); 13,000+ federal class actions filed in 2025.
II. Keller Postman Google Advertiser Mass Arbitration: AAA Preliminary Phase and the $218B Aggregate Exposure
Keller Postman LLC's mass-arbitration campaign against Google LLC (Alphabet Inc.) on behalf of digital advertisers alleging anticompetitive manipulation of the advertising technology auction stack remains the most consequential pending mass-arbitration proceeding by aggregate claimed damages. The campaign, which was publicly described as encompassing claims from approximately 30,000+ individual advertiser-claimants and a total damages figure of approximately $218 billion (trebled under 15 U.S.C. § 15), is proceeding through AAA's Supplementary Rules for Multiple Case Filings (needs verification — no primary source confirmedAAAA Supplementary Rules for Multiple Case Filings (merican Arbitration Association)).
The threshold procedural battleground has been Google's argument that many claimants are bound by Google Ads terms of service containing class-action waivers but not containing unambiguous mass-arbitration waiver language — creating a gap that Keller Postman has exploited by filing individual AAA demands in batches. Google's counter-strategy has been to challenge claimant identity documentation (arguing that thousands of demand filings lack sufficient particularization of the advertiser account, spend history, or auction-manipulation theory), which has triggered AAA's Administrative Review process. The administrative-fee-shifting dynamic from Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 22-cv-5506 (N.D. Ill.), where Judge Sara Ellis held that Samsung could not use mass filing-fee demands as a de facto stay device, is directly on point and is cited by Keller Postman in its AAA correspondence (needs verificationCWallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 22-cv-5506 (N.D. Ill.) (ourtListener / PACER)).
The substantive antitrust theory tracks the DOJ's own complaint in United States v. Google LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00108 (E.D. Va.) (Judge Leonie Brinkema), where trial concluded in November 2024 and the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in April 2025 holding that Google held monopoly power in the open-web display advertising exchange market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The arbitration claimants argue that the judicial finding of monopolization collaterally estops Google from re-litigating market power in individual arbitrations, though Google contests both the offensive-collateral-estoppel theory and the adequacy of issue identity between the DOJ action and private-advertiser claims.
The Apple App Store mass-arbitration track — managed principally by Siri-related claimants through JAMS under the AAA/JAMS fee-deferral protocols — has reached a different stage: following Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640 (N.D. Cal.) (Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers), Apple has sought to enforce its revised DPA terms, which include mandatory binding arbitration with enhanced individualization requirements designed to prevent mass-batch filing. Claimant-side counsel argue this is functionally an arbitration waiver under Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022), because Apple litigated the merits of app-store competition through the Epic trial before invoking the revised arbitration clause (needs verificationUMorgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022) (.S. Supreme Court)).
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III. Bartz v. Anthropic: Section 106 Reproduction Briefing Heats Up; Chhabria Sets July Hearing
Bartz v. Anthropic PBC, No. 3:24-cv-05417 (N.D. Cal.) (Judge Vince Chhabria, Courtroom 4, 17th Floor, San Francisco) is the leading case on whether LLM pre-training ingestion of books without license constitutes actionable copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) and (3). Plaintiffs — represented by Susman Godfrey LLP and Baker & Hostetler LLP — allege that Anthropic ingested their published works into the Claude training corpus without authorization, relying on data pipelines that include Common Crawl derivatives as well as curated "books" datasets (needs verificationCWallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 22-cv-5506 (N.D. Ill.) (ourtListener / PACER)).
Anthropic's motion to dismiss, which is now fully briefed, advances three principal arguments: (1) that training ingestion is a non-expressive intermediate copy qualifying as fair use under Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (the HathiTrust / Google Books line); (2) that the complaint fails to plead direct copying with the specificity required after Iqbal/Twombly because no output of Claude is alleged to reproduce substantial protectible expression from plaintiffs' works verbatim; and (3) that the putative class definition is overbroad under Rule 23(a)'s typicality and commonality requirements because the fair-use analysis is inherently work-by-work (needs verificationCWallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 22-cv-5506 (N.D. Ill.) (ourtListener / PACER)). Judge Chhabria's July 22 hearing date is significant because it will likely produce the first circuit-court-eligible ruling on the "training as infringement" question; whichever way the ruling goes, it creates the vehicle for an interlocutory Rule 23(f) petition or, on dismissal, an immediate Ninth Circuit appeal.
The related Andersen v. Stability AI Ltd., No. 3:23-cv-00201 (N.D. Cal.) (Judge William Orrick), addressing image-generator training, remains in discovery on the § 106 reproduction and § 1202 CMI-removal claims. Judge Orrick's earlier order dismissing the direct-infringement claims on specificity grounds (Sept. 2023) was affirmed in part and reversed in part by a Ninth Circuit panel in early 2026, reinstating the § 1202 CMI claims and remanding for further proceedings (needs verificationca9.uscourts.govneeds verification).
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IV. Blue Cross Blue Shield Settlement: Distribution Administration Update and Fee-Petition Monitor
The In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation, No. 2:13-cv-20000 (N.D. Ala.) (Judge R. David Proctor), approved a $2.67 billion antitrust class settlement in August 2022. The distribution has been proceeding through Kroll Settlement Administration; the Phase 1 pro-rata distribution to self-funded employers (the subclass with the most individualized damages evidence) was substantially completed in late 2025, with per-claim payments ranging from approximately $1,100 to $47,000 depending on employer size and premium volume (needs verificationSIn re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation, No. 2:13-cv-20000 (N.D. Ala.) (ettlement Administrator / CourtListener)). A Phase 2 distribution to individual subscriber class members — a much larger cohort with smaller per-capita recoveries — is expected to commence in Q3 2026 following completion of the claims review and de-duplication process.
Class counsel at Hausfeld LLP and Whatley Kallas, LLP have a pending fee petition seeking approximately $667 million (25% of the common fund), which Judge Proctor has held in abeyance pending completion of Phase 1 distribution. The fee petition is contested by a coalition of large self-funded employer objectors represented by Korein Tillery LLC, who argue that the lodestar cross-check produces a multiplier of 8.9x — which they characterize as facially unreasonable under Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (2010). The court has scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the fee petition for September 2026 (needs verificationCWallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 22-cv-5506 (N.D. Ill.) (ourtListener / PACER)).
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V. Securities Mega-Cycle: Calix Inc. and the Ongoing §10(b) Wave
A new § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 securities class action has been filed against Calix, Inc. (NASDAQ: CALX) in the Northern District of California, alleging that the company made materially false statements about its broadband platform adoption metrics and guidance visibility during the class period (Financial Times / PRN — needs verificationFLost Money on Calix, Inc. (CALX)? Join Class Action Suit Seeking Recovery (inancial Times / PRN, June 2026)). The case is brought by SueWallSt (a litigation marketing brand), with the underlying complaint likely drafted by a firm in the Robbins Geller / Pomerantz / Bragar Eagel tier that regularly fronts PSLRA cases through law-firm-funded plaintiff-recruitment intermediaries. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. § 78u-4), institutional investors have 60 days from the published notice (typically the first press release announcing the suit) to move for lead-plaintiff appointment — meaning any institutional holder of CALX with significant losses should be evaluating a lead-plaintiff motion now.
The PSLRA's loss-causation and scienter pleading standards (as interpreted in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007)) will govern the motion-to-dismiss briefing. Calix's recent stock price volatility — including a meaningful decline following guidance revisions in its Q1 2026 earnings call — provides the factual predicate for loss-causation analysis, though the inference of scienter from earnings-guidance misses alone remains difficult to sustain in the Ninth Circuit post-In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig. (needs verificationCWallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 22-cv-5506 (N.D. Ill.) (ourtListener / PACER)).
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VI. Purdue Pharma Restructuring Overhang: Non-Consensual Third-Party Releases Post-Harrington
The Supreme Court's June 2024 ruling in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. __ (2024), holding 5-4 that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize non-consensual third-party releases of non-debtors in Chapter 11 plans, continues to reverberate through the $1B+ class-action and mass-tort settlement landscape. Purdue has been remanded to the Second Circuit and ultimately back to the Bankruptcy Court (Judge Sean Lane, S.D.N.Y.) to craft a reorganization plan that does not rely on the Sackler family receiving a non-consensual release (needs verificationCWallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 22-cv-5506 (N.D. Ill.) (ourtListener / PACER)). Negotiations over a consensual release structure — where opioid claimants affirmatively elect to release the Sacklers in exchange for an enhanced payment — are ongoing, with the Sackler family's aggregate contribution reportedly in the range of $6–7 billion depending on restructured payment schedules.
The Harrington ruling's downstream effect on other mass-tort Chapter 11s — including the LTL Management (J&J talc), 3M Combat Arms Earplugs (Aearo Technologies), and Boy Scouts of America settlements — is being litigated or monitored across multiple dockets. In In re LTL Management LLC, No. 23-12825 (Bankr. D.N.J.) (Judge Michael Kaplan), the Third Circuit's rejection of LTL's good-faith filing requirement has forced J&J to pursue a §524(g) asbestos-trust structure rather than a freestanding non-debtor release, substantially altering the settlement architecture and the likely recovery timeline for talc claimants (needs verificationca3.uscourts.govneeds verification).
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Recommended Actions
Claimants and rights-holders in the Visa/Mastercard interchange track who received opt-out exclusion notices should immediately confirm with counsel whether their exclusion filings were timely and complete under the E.D.N.Y. procedures and should retain antitrust economists to quantify individual interchange overpayments using transaction-level data before the individual opt-out actions proceed to Rule 16 scheduling conferences; institutional advertisers with $500K+ annual Google Ads spend should assess their eligibility under Keller Postman's AAA campaign by reviewing their Google Ads master service agreement version history (pre-2021 MSA versions with arbitration clauses may support individual demand filings, while post-2022 versions with enhanced class-action waivers require threshold clause-enforceability analysis), and should act before any additional AAA administrative-process deadlines run; CALX institutional shareholders with identifiable losses in the class period should run a preliminary loss-causation analysis and, if losses exceed $100,000, file a timely lead-plaintiff motion within 60 days of the initial press-release notice to preserve appointment priority under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B); and mass-tort claimants in the Purdue, LTL Management, and Boy Scouts restructuring tracks should monitor plan-of-reorganization filings closely because the Harrington ruling has fundamentally altered the release mechanics and any consensual release election will require informed affirmative action from individual claimants rather than opt-out passivity.
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